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Abstract—Private information retrieval scheme for coded data
storage is considered in this paper. We focus on the case where
the size of each data record is large and hence only the download
cost (but not the upload cost for transmitting retrieval queries) is
of interest. We prove that the tradeoff between storage cost and
retrieval/download cost depends on the number of data records
in the system. We also propose a fairly general class of linear
storage codes and retrieval schemes and derive conditions under
which our retrieval schemes are error-free and private. Tradeoffs
between the storage cost and retrieval costs are also obtained.
Finally, we consider special cases when the underlying storage
code is based on an MDS code. Using our proposed method, we
show that a randomly generated retrieval scheme is indeed very
likely to be private and error-free.
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern data storage system, data are usually stored at
multiple storage nodes in the cloud. However, system failures
are inevitable and in fact common in modern information-
technological infrastructure. These failures can be caused by
hardware or software failures, or even natural disaster (such as
fires, earthquakes and flooding). Another big challenge is how
to ensure data stored in the cloud are protected from loss and
from being overwritten by illegitimate parties. To ensure that
data will not be lost in the case of failures, data redundancy
are required. Traditionally, several copies of the same data will
be stored. Thus, if one of the copies stored in a node is lost,
the lost content can be recovered by retrieving a copy of the
data from other surviving nodes.
Such replication approach is not efficient in terms of storage
cost. An alternative approach is to use erasure codes (such
as Reed-Solomon codes, an example of maximum distance
separable codes) to store the data. Thus, any content loss can
then be seen as a data erasure and be recovered from the
code. Comparing with replication, this coding approach has
a lower storage cost but also a higher repair cost (measured
by the amount of data sent to repair a failure node). There
is a fundamental tradeoff between the costs for storage and
repair. In [1], regenerating codes were proposed to achieve
the optimal tradeoff between storage cost and repair cost. This
approach has since received a lot of attentions [2]–[5].
In some data storage applications, not only the data pro-
tection against system failure and illegitimate parties is a
concern but also the privacy of data retrieval query needs to
be protected. For example, consider investors retrieving stock
prices from a cloud storage provider (CSP). In this case, it is
preferred to keep the identity of the stocks secret from other
users and the CSP. Private information retrieval (PIR) ensures
that servers storing data would not know the identity of the
data record that a user is retrieving. One naive approach to
achieve PIR is by downloading every record in the system no
matter which record the user is needed. The downside of this
approach is the extremely large retrieval cost, which linearly
increases with N (the number of records stored).
The challenge however is how to design an efficient PIR
scheme (in terms of costs for data storage and retrieval). In a
k-server PIR scheme, a user sends k queries to k servers which
will reply to the user k answers. The retrieval efficiency of a
PIR scheme is measured by the upload cost (i.e., the size of the
queries) and the retrieval cost (i.e., the size of the answers).
The sum of these two costs is referred to as the total com-
munication complexity. In [6], two very interesting schemes
were proposed. The first scheme achieves total communication
complexity with O(N
1
K ) where K is the number of servers
and N is the number of data records. If there are 13 log2(N)+1
servers, the second scheme achieves a total communication
complexity with 13 (1 + o(1)) · log22(N) · log2(log2(2N)).
These results were further elaborated in [7, Sec. 3.1-3.4].
For data records of size equal to `, a PIR scheme with total
communication complexity equal to 4` was proposed. Note
that all these PIR schemes require that each storage node stores
a copy of every data records. This paper considers a more
general scenario where this requirement is not necessarily
satisfied.
In [8], a single-database “computational” PIR scheme to
achieve retrieval cost less than N was proposed. Unlike previ-
ous information-theoretic schemes, the privacy of the identity
of the retrieved data is protected based on the computational
hardness of the quadratic residuosity problem. This scheme
can achieve N  for any  > 0 by assuming the hardness of
deciding quadratic residuosity. In [9], [10], PIR schemes which
achieve a retrieval cost of log2N were proposed. However, the
computational complexity of these schemes is of concern. In
fact, a scheme which requires less computation of public-key
operations was shown in [11]. Information-theoretic approach
has also been considered to achieve PIR [12]. A more general
model was considered in [13] in which 1) not every server
may respond to the query and 2) some servers are tampered
and hence erroneous responses will be returned to the users.
There are many other works which considered similar PIR
problems. Due to limited space, please refer to [7] for more
details.
Almost all of the existing works on PIR assume uncoded
data storage (where each storage node stores a copy of every
data record). However, uncoded storage (or more precisely,
storage based on repetition codes) has the highest storage
cost. To reduce the storage cost, coded storage (e.g., ones
that base on maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, or
locally repairable codes) have been proposed. Motivated by
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2the advances in coded data storage, this paper considers PIR
schemes for coded data storage system.
To the best of our knowledge, the recent work [14] is the
only existing work that discusses private information retrieval
in coded storage. However, there are some fundamental dif-
ferences between the approach in [14] and the one considered
in this paper. In [14], it was proved that only one extra bit
is required to download to ensure the privacy of the identity
of retrieved record. However, the extremely low retrieval cost
comes with a price that the number of storage nodes (and also
the storage cost) needs to grow with the data record size. We
however assume that the number of storage nodes is fixed.
In [14, Section V], PIR schemes for MDS codes based
storage were proposed. The optimality of these schemes were
not discussed. In contrast, this paper considers a fairly general
framework where we impose no restriction on the choice of
the underlying storage codes. We obtain the tradeoffs between
storage cost and retrieval cost and show that the optimal
tradeoff can be achieved if MDS codes are used. Unlike in
[14] where the number of data records is assumed to be fixed,
we will also show that the optimal tradeoff between the storage
and retrieval costs also depend on the number of records in
the system.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section II is the
background for storage codes and private information retrieval
(PIR) scheme. In Section III, we propose our PIR schemes for
coded storage. Sufficient conditions for which our scheme is
private will be derived. In Section IV, we will identify the
tradeoff between storage cost and retrieval cost.
Notations: For random variables X,Y , the entropy of X
will be denoted by H(X), while the mutual information
between X and Y is denoted by I(X;Y ). A set of random
variables (Xi, i ∈ α) can also be denoted by Xα. Random
variables are usually denoted by capital letters (such as X,Y
etc) while their realisations by small letters. Sample spaces
over which random variables are defined will be denoted by
calligraphic letters.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Formulation
We assume that there are N data records (Dn, n ∈ N ,
{1, . . . , N}) to be stored in K data storage nodes (indexed
by K , {1, . . . ,K}). Assume without loss of generality that
these data records are independently and uniformly distributed
over a common sample space D. In other words,
Pr(Dn = dn, n ∈ N ) = 1/|D|N . (1)
Hence, H(DN ) =
∑
n∈N H(Dn) and H(Dn) = log |D|.
Definition 1 (Storage Code): For any k ∈ K, let Xk (de-
fined over XK) be the content stored in storage node k. A
(N,K) storage code is defined by an encoding mapping
Ω : DN →
∏
k∈K
Xk
...
DM
Q1
QK
M
A1
AKXK
X1
Query Generation
Server
Response
Decode
M,Q1, . . . , QK
Figure 1. Retrieving data record DM
such that (X1, . . . , XK) = Ω(DN ).
Clearly, it is required that all data D1, . . . , DN can be
retrieved from the contents in the K storage nodes. In other
words, H(D1, . . . , DN |X1, . . . , XK) = 0. In addition, there
are often other criteria that a storage code needs to satisfy. For
instance, contents stored at a storage node may be corrupted
(due to software or hardware failures) and hence need to be
recovered from other storage nodes. For example, one may
require that for any k ∈ K, there exists a subset α ⊆ K \ {k}
of size at most r such that H(Xk|Xj , j ∈ α) = 0 [3], [15].
In other scenarios, it may also be required that all data can
still be recovered when there are multiple (no more than δ)
simultaneous node failures. In this case, it is required that
H(XK|Xj , j ∈ β) = 0
for any β ⊆ K of size K − δ.
For any storage code Ω, we will use SC(Ω) to denote the
storage cost, which is the number of bits each storage node
must use to store one information bit. More precisely,
SC(Ω) , max
k∈K
log |Xk|
N log |D| . (2)
Remark 1: We do not assume any compression schemes
used in the storage and hence log |Xk| is used instead of
H(Xk). As log |Xk| ≥ H(Xk), results obtained in this
paper will still hold if H(Xk) is used. Also, there are other
alternative storage cost measures (e.g., “the total storage cost”∑
k∈K log |Xk|/N log |D|). We consider (2) to focus on the
required storage cost on individual nodes. With respect to
our code (to be defined in Section III), the two measures
differed only by a constant multiplicative factor K (which is
the number of storage nodes and is fixed).
Clearly, a data storage will be useless if the stored data can-
not be retrieved. A retrieval scheme usually consists of three
steps (see Figure 1). The first step is the queries generation.
Let M ∈ N be the index of the data record to be retrieved.
We will assume that M is uniformly distributed over N . To
retrieve DM , a user will first generate K queries (Qk, k ∈ K)
3according to a conditional probability distribution1
Λ1(qk, k ∈ K|m) = Pr(Qk = qk, k ∈ K|M = m). (3)
Then, the query Qk will be sent to storage node k. We call
Λ1 the “query generation distribution”.
In the second step, each storage node k, receiving Qk, will
generate a response via the function
Λ2,k : Xk ×Qk → Ak. (4)
In particular, Ak , Λ2,k(Xk, Qk) will be computed and
returned to the user. The mappings (Λ2,k, k ∈ K) are called
“response mappings”. Finally, in the third step, the user will
“decode” DM from (M,Qk, Ak, k ∈ K).
Definition 2: A retrieval scheme Λ is specified by the query
generation distribution and the response mappings
Λ , (Λ1,Λ2,k, k ∈ K).
Remark 2: Once the storage code Ω and the re-
trieval scheme Λ are given, the probability distribution of
(M,Xk, Qk, Ak, k ∈ K, Dn, n ∈ N ) is well-defined. In
particular,
(XK, DN ) ⊥ (M,QK) (5)
H(Ak|Qk, Xk) = 0 (6)
H(Dn, n ∈ N ) =
∑
n∈N
H(Dn). (7)
Conversely, if the probability distribution of (Xk, k ∈
K, Dn, n ∈ N ) is known, then one can also deduce the under-
lying storage code Ω. Similarly, the probability distributions of
(M,Qk, k ∈ K) (and (Qk, Ak, Xk)) respectively specify Λ1
(and Λ2,k). Therefore, in this paper, we often refer a storage
system by the set of random variables (M,Xk, Qk, Ak, k ∈
K, Dn, n ∈ N ).
Definition 3 (Error-free Retrieval): For a given storage
code Ω, a retrieval scheme Λ is called error-free if
H(DM |M,QK, AK) = 0. (8)
Definition 4 (Private Retrieval): Let Φ be a collection of
subsets of K. A retrieval scheme Λ is called Φ-private if
I(M ;Qj , j ∈ α) = 0 (9)
for all subset α ∈ Φ. We call α the collusion pattern.
According to our definitions, if a retrieval scheme is error-
free and Φ-private, then 1) a user can always retrieve (and
decode) its interested data record DM with no errors, and 2)
for any α ∈ Φ, the colluding set of storage nodes (i.e., indexed
by α) obtains no information about the identity (the index M )
but not necessarily the content of the record being retrieved
(i.e., DM ).
1 In this paper, we consider the general case that queries are randomly
generated to prevent the storage nodes from knowing the identity of the data
record to be retrieved.
The retrieval cost RC(Λ,Ω) of a retrieval scheme Λ (with
respect to an underlying storage code Ω) is defined by
RC(Λ,Ω) , max
k∈K
log |Ak|
log |D| .
Since each Dn is uniformly distributed over D,
RC(Λ,Ω) = max
k∈K
log |Ak|
H(D1)
≥ max
k∈K
H(Ak)
H(D1)
.
The retrieval cost RC(Λ,Ω) measures the number of bits
required to retrieve from a server node, for each information
bit of a record.
Remark 3: In this paper, we consider the case when the size
of each data record is large. Due to (5) and (8), H(AK) ≥
H(DM ). Thus, the retrieval cost must grow with the size of
data. However, this is not necessary the case for upload cost
(transmission bandwidths required to send the queries to the
storage nodes). To illustrate, suppose we are given a (N,K)
storage code Ω, together with a retrieval scheme Λ, such that
each data record is of size log |D| bits. Now, suppose the size
of each data record is in fact c log |D| bits. In this case, we can
partition each data record into c chunks, each of size log |D|
bits. For i = 1, . . . , c, we may store the ith chunk of all
the data records using the storage code Ω. To retrieve a data
record, a user can retrieve all the c chunks of the record using
the retrieval scheme Λ. The catch however is that the retrieval
query sent to a storage node can be the same for every chunk.
Hence, only one (not c) query is sent, and the upload cost
stays the same for all c. In addition, similar to the case of
storage cost, we use log |Ak| instead of H(AK). Yet, results
obtained in this paper will still hold if H(AK) is used.
B. Achievability
A core question in private information retrieval is to deter-
mine the fundamental tradeoffs between storage and retrieval
costs of error-free and private retrieval schemes. To facilitate
our discussion, we will need the following definitions.
Definition 5 (Achievability): With respect to a given K and
collusion patterns Φ, a storage-retrieval cost tuple (SC∗,RC∗)
is called N -achievable if there exists a (N,K) storage code
Ω and a Φ-private error free retrieval scheme Λ such that
SC(Ω) ≤ SC∗ (10)
RC(Λ,Ω) ≤ RC∗. (11)
Furthermore, it is called strongly achievable if there ex-
ists a sequence (indexed by a) of N (a)-achievable tuples
(SC(a),RC(a)) such that
1) lima→∞N (a) =∞
2) lim supa→∞ SC
(a) ≤ SC∗
3) lim supa→∞ RC
(a) ≤ RC∗.
Remark 4: Clearly, a strongly achievable storage-retrieval
cost tuple is also N -achievable (for any fixed N ). However,
as we shall prove in Theorem 1, the converse is not true in
general.
4Example 1: Let D1, . . . , DN be the data records where
Dn ∈ GF (q) for 1 ≤ n ≤ N . Construct a PIR scheme as
follows: Let Q0 be the vector whose M th entry is one and
all the others are equal to zero. Encode the “secret message”
Q0 with a linear secret sharing scheme that is defined by K
random shares Q1, . . . , QK such that
1) for any collusion pattern α ∈ Φ, I(Q0;Qk, k ∈ α) = 0
2) there exists coefficients c1, . . . , cK such that
Q0 =
K∑
k=1
ckQk. (12)
Then, Qk will be sent to storage node k for k ∈ K.
Upon receiving Qk, node k will return the response Ak ,
[D1, . . . , DN ]Qk. By (12), we have
DM = [D1, . . . , DN ]Q0 (13)
= [D1, . . . , DN ]
K∑
k=1
ckQk (14)
=
K∑
k=1
ckAk. (15)
Therefore, the user can decode the desired data record DM .
Furthermore, by the definition of the secret sharing code,
I(M ;Qj) = 0 for all α ∈ Φ. Hence, the so-constructed
scheme is indeed a Φ-private error-free retrieval scheme.
The above example requires that each storage node stores
every data record. Therefore, the storage cost is the highest
(equal to 1). The following example however considers coded
storage.
Example 2 (PIR for coded storage): We consider N = 2.
Each of the two record contains two bits. Assume without loss
of generality that the first record is (a1, b1) and the second one
is (a2, b2). There are K = 3 storage nodes, each of which will
store two bits. The first server will store X1 = (a1, b1), the
second X2 = (a2, b2) and the third X3 = (a1 ⊕ a2, a2 ⊕ b2).
Clearly, the storage cost of this code is only 1/2.
server 1 server 2 server 3
Qk = 1 a1 a2 a1 ⊕ a2
Qk = 2 b1 b2 b1 ⊕ b2
Qk = 3 a1 ⊕ b1 a2 ⊕ b2 a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ b1 ⊕ b2
Table I
RESPONSE MAPPINGS
Let Φ be the set of all α such that |α| = 1. We will assume
that each query Qk (for k = 1, 2, 3) is a ternary random
variables taking values from the set {1, 2, 3}. Table I defines
how Ak is generated from Qk and Xk. For example, if Q2 = 2,
then A2 (the response generated by server 2) will be equal to
b2. If Q3 = 3, then A3 = a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ b1 ⊕ b2. Now, we will
define the conditional probability distribution of (Q1, Q2, Q3)
given M (the index of the record to be retrieved) such that
Pr(Q1 = q1, Q2 = q2, Q3 = q3|M = 1) = 1/3
if (q1, q2, q3) ∈ {(1, 3, 3), (2, 1, 1), (3, 2, 2)}, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, we define
Pr(Q1 = q1, Q2 = q2, Q3 = q3|M = 2) = 1/3
if (q1, q2, q3) ∈ {(3, 1, 3), (1, 2, 1), (2, 3, 2)}. It can be verified
directly that
I(Qk;M) = 0
for all k = 1, 2, 3 and hence the retrieval scheme is private. In
addition, the user can always reconstruct the desired record.
For example, when M = 1 and
(q1, q2, q3) = (1, 3, 3),
then the user will receive a1, a2⊕b2 and a1⊕b1⊕a2⊕b2 from
the three servers. Clearly, in this case, the user can decode a1
and b1 back. The retrieval cost of this scheme is equal to 1/2.
Hence, (1/2, 1/2) is 2-achievable.
Theorem 1: Suppose K = 3 and
Φ = {{k} : k ∈ K}.
Then the storage-retrieval cost tuple (1/2, 1/2) is 2-achievable
but not strongly achievable.
Proof: The 2-achievability of the storage-retrieval cost
tuple (1/2, 1/2) follows from Example 2. The proof for that
it is not strongly achievable will be given in Appendix A.
As a corollary from Theorem 1, N -achievability and strong
achievability are in fact different. This implies that the tradeoff
between the storage cost and retrieval cost does depend on the
number of data records in the system. To our best knowledge,
this is the first proof for such a phenomenon.
III. LINEAR PIR CODES
Example 1 is a PIR scheme constructed from a secret
sharing scheme. It requires that each storage node contains all
the N records and hence its storage cost is the highest (equal
to 1). In contrast, the storage cost of the code in Example 2
is only 1/2. In this section, we will propose a class of storage
codes, together with its corresponding retrieval scheme. As we
shall see in Section IV, our class of codes can be constructed
over a wide range of storage-retrieval cost tuples.
We will first begin with the description of the storage code.
In our proposed scheme, we denote the N data records by
d1, . . . ,dN each of which is a vector of length (K − S)L
over GF (q) for some positive integer constants L and S
(whose physical meaning will become clear later). In our
proposed scheme, each data record will be “encoded and
stored” separately. Specifically, there exists K mappings
gk : D → GF (q)L, k ∈ K
such that gk(dn) is the “coded data piece” of dn being stored
in storage node k. Therefore, for data records d1, . . . ,dN , the
storage node k will store the length LN vector
Xk = [gk(d1), . . . , gk(dN )]
>
5V =

v∗1,1,1 · · · v∗1,R,1 v∗1,1,2 · · · v∗1,R,2 · · · · · · v∗1,1,K · · · v∗1,R,K
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . . . . .
...
. . .
...
v∗L,1,1 · · · v∗L,R,1 v∗L,1,2 · · · v∗L,R,2 · · · · · · v∗L,1,K · · · v∗L,R,K
v1,1,1 · · · v1,R,1 v1,1,2 · · · v1,R,2 · · · · · · v1,1,K · · · v1,R,K
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . . . . .
...
. . .
...
vT,1,1 · · · vT,R,1 vT,1,2 · · · vT,R,2 · · · · · · vT,1,K · · · vT,R,K

(16)
In order to retrieve dn without errors, it is necessary that
the data record dn and [gk(dn)>, k ∈ K] are one-to-one
corresponded. Therefore, dn and [gk(dn)>, k ∈ K] can be
used interchangeably. In fact, for notation simplicity, we will
simply write dn as
[gk(dn)
>, k ∈ K] =
 dn,1,1 · · · dn,1,K... . . . ...
dn,L,1 · · · dn,L,K
 (17)
such that
gk(dn) = [dn,1,k, . . . , dn,L,k]
is the transpose of the kth column of dn.
Now, to define the storage code, it suffices to define gk, or
equivalently, the condition that [gk(dn)>, k ∈ K] must satisfy.
In this paper, we will consider a wide class of linear storage
codes such that
dnP = 0 (18)
for a full-rank K × S parity check matrix
P =
 p1,1 · · · p1,S... . . . ...
pK,1 · · · pK,S
 . (19)
The choice of P determines the type of storage codes that are
being used. For uncoded storage, P is the K×K−1 full rank
matrix such that
[1, 1, . . . , 1]P = 0.
Following our convention, the storage node k will store a
length LN column vector
Xk , [d1,1,k, . . . , d1,L,k, d2,1,k, . . . , d2,L,k, . . . , dN,L,k]>,
which is obtained by concatenating the kth column of each
record. As a result, it is obvious that
K∑
k=1
pk,sXk = 0. (20)
For notation simplicity, we will refer our code as ∆P,N,L
(or just ∆P when N and L are understood implicitly). It can
be directly verified that its storage cost is
SC(∆P) = 1/(K − S). (21)
Next, we will define a general class of information retrieval
schemes for the above storage code ∆P. Our proposed re-
trieval scheme is defined by a (T + L)×RK matrix V (see
(16)), whose columns will be respectively labeled by
V1,1, . . . , VR,1, V1,2, . . . , VR,2, . . . , V1,K , . . . , VR,K .
We will refer the retrieval scheme as ΘV. A user can retrieve
the M th record dM by following the steps below:
1) (Initialisation) Generate a LN × T random matrix U,
whose entries are all randomly and independently se-
lected from GF (q). Let the columns of U be respec-
tively
Ut, t ∈ T , {1 . . . , UT }.
2) (Query Generation) For each k ∈ K, the user will
generate R “query” vectors Q1,k . . . QR,k such that
Qr,k ,
T∑
t=1
vt,r,kUt +
L∑
`=1
v∗`,r,kEM,`. (22)
Here, vt,r,k and v∗`,r,k are defined as in (16) and EM,`
is a length LN column vector whose entry is 1 on the
L(M−1)+` th row and is 0 otherwise. In other words,
EM,` is the vector such that
EM,`
>Xk = dM,`,k (23)
for all M ∈ N , ` ∈ L , {1, . . . , L} and k ∈ K.
3) (Response Mappings) The collection of the R query
vectors
(Qr,k, r ∈ R , {1, . . . , R})
will then be sent to storage node k, which will respond
by computing and returning to user the tuple (Ar,k, r =
1, . . . , R) where Ar,k = Q>r,kXk. Thus,
Ar,k =
T∑
t=1
vt,r,kU
>
t Xk +
L∑
`=1
v∗r,`,kdM,`,k. (24)
As each storage node will return R symbols back to the
user, the retrieval cost is thus
RC(ΘV,∆P) =
R
L(K − S) . (25)
Ideally, the data record
dM = (dM,`,k, ` ∈ L, k ∈ K)
should be obtained by solving the system of linear equations
6(24), together with
U>t
K∑
k=1
pk,sXk = 0, (26)
K∑
k=1
pk,sdM,`,k = 0, (27)
for all s ∈ S , {1, . . . , S} and ` ∈ L. However, a retrieval
scheme ΘV is not necessarily error-free (where dM can be
solved without errors) or private. The following theorem gives
conditions on V (with respect to the storage code ∆P) under
which our retrieval scheme is in fact error-free and private.
Theorem 2: The retrieval scheme ΘV is error-free if the
following system of linear equations
∑K
k=1 wt,kpk,s = 0, ∀t ∈ T , s ∈ S∑K
k=1 w
∗
`,kpk,s = 0, ∀` ∈ L, s ∈ S∑T
t=1 vt,r,kwt,k +
∑L
`=1 v
∗
`,r,kw
∗
`,k = 0,
∀k ∈ K, r ∈ R
(28)
has a unique solution, where the unknowns are
(wt,k, t ∈ T , k ∈ K, w∗l,k, l ∈ L, k ∈ K).
The condition is called retrievability condition.
Furthermore, the retrieval scheme is Φ-private if
〈Vr,k, r ∈ R, k ∈ α〉 ∩ V0 = {0} (29)
for any collusion pattern α ∈ Φ. Here, V0 is the L di-
mensional vector space containing all vectors of the form
[c1, . . . , cL, 0, . . . , 0]
>. We call (29) the privacy condition.
Proof: For any t ∈ T , r ∈ R and k ∈ K, let
wt,k , U>t Xk (30)
w∗`,k , dM,`,k. (31)
Then rewriting (24), we have
Ar,k =
T∑
t=1
vt,r,kwt,k +
L∑
`=1
v∗r,`,kw
∗
`,k. (32)
Invoking (20), for all t ∈ T and s ∈ S, we have
U>t
(
K∑
k=1
pk,sXk
)
= 0. (33)
Consequently,
K∑
k=1
pk,swt,k = 0. (34)
Similarly, by (18), we have
K∑
k=1
pk,sw
∗
`,k = 0, ∀` ∈ L, s ∈ S. (35)
As the matrices P and V are chosen to satisfy the re-
trievability condition (that (28) has a unique solution), the
system of linear equations (32), (34) and (35) also has a unique
solution. Hence, the user can uniquely decode dM . Therefore,
DM is a function of M,QK, AK and hence ΘV is error-free.
Next, we will prove that ΘV is Φ-private if (29) is satisfied.
Let α ∈ Φ be a collusion pattern. Assume without loss of
generality that α = {1, . . . , |α|}. Let G and G− be two
submatrices of V as defined in (36) and (37). Note that both G
and G− have exactly |α|R columns. By invoking elementary
column operations, we can prove the existence of an invertible
matrix C such that G−C has rank δ ≤ T and
G−C =
 f1,1 f1,2 · · · f1,δ 0 · · · 0... ... . . . ... ... . . . ...
fT,1 fT,2 · · · fT,δ 0 · · · 0

is in the reduced column echelon form. In particular, for each
a = 1, . . . , δ, there exists an index 1 ≤ ta ≤ T such that
fta,a 6= 0 (38)
fta,b = 0, ∀b 6= a. (39)
Now, consider the matrix
GC =

f∗1,1 f
∗
1,2 · · · f∗1,δ f∗1,δ+1 · · · f∗1,R|α|
...
...
. . .
...
... · · · ...
f∗L,1 f
∗
L,2 · · · f∗L,δ f∗L,δ+1 · · · f∗L,R|α|
f1,1 f1,2 · · · f1,δ 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
fT,1 fT,2 · · · fT,δ 0 · · · 0

.
The privacy condition (29) guarantees that
f∗`,δ+1 = · · · = f∗`,R|α| = 0
for all ` = 1, . . . , L. Now, let[
Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
R|α|
]
=
[
Q1,1, . . . , QR,|α|
]
C (40)
and U∗ = [EM,1, · · · , EM,L,U]. Then it can be verified
directly that [
Q1,1, . . . , QR,|α|
]
= U∗G.
Hence,
[Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
R|α|]
= [Q1,1, . . . , QR,|α|]C
= U∗GC
= U∗

f∗1,1 f
∗
1,2 · · · f∗1,δ 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
... · · · ...
f∗L,1 f
∗
L,2 · · · f∗L,δ 0 · · · 0
f1,1 f1,2 · · · f1,δ 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
fT,1 fT,2 · · · fT,δ 0 · · · 0

.
Note that Q∗i = 0 for all i = δ+ 1, . . . , R|α|. Now, for any
7G =

v∗1,1,1 · · · v∗1,R,1 v∗1,1,2 · · · v∗1,R,2 · · · · · · v∗1,1,|α| · · · v∗1,R,|α|
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . . . . .
...
. . .
...
v∗L,1,1 · · · v∗L,R,1 v∗L,1,2 · · · v∗L,R,2 · · · · · · v∗L,1,|α| · · · v∗L,R,|α|
v1,1,1 · · · v1,R,1 v1,1,2 · · · v1,R,2 · · · · · · v1,1,|α| · · · v1,R,|α|
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . . . . .
...
. . .
...
vT,1,1 · · · vT,R,1 vT,1,2 · · · vT,R,2 · · · · · · vT,1,|α| · · · vT,R,|α|

(36)
G− =
 v1,1,1 · · · v1,R,1 v1,1,2 · · · v1,R,2 · · · · · · v1,1,|α| · · · v1,R,|α|... . . . ... ... . . . ... . . . . . . ... . . . ...
vT,1,1 · · · vT,R,1 vT,1,2 · · · vT,R,2 · · · · · · vT,1,|α| · · · vT,R,|α|
 (37)
a = 1, . . . , δ,
Q∗a =
T∑
t=1
ft,aUt +
L∑
`=1
f∗`,aEM,` (41)
= fta,aUta +
∑
t 6=ta
ft,kUt +
L∑
`=1
f∗`,aEM,`. (42)
Clearly, each Q∗a can be written as a sum of columns in
U∗. However, by (38)-(39), the column Uta appears only in
the sum for Q∗a. As entries in each Uta are uniformly and
independently distributed GF (q), we can in fact prove that
each Q∗a in (Q
∗
1, . . . , Q
∗
R|α|) is uniformly and independently
distributed to each other, no matter what M is. In other words,
I(Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
R|α|;M) = 0. (43)
Finally, by (40), we have
I(Q1,1, . . . , QR,|α|;M) = 0. (44)
As (44) holds for all α ∈ Φ, our retrieval scheme is indeed
Φ-private. And the theorem is proved.
Remark 5: It is worth to mention that our codes and re-
trieval schemes are well-defined irrespective of N . Therefore,
if a storage-retrieval cost tuple (SC,RC) can be achieved using
our proposed schemes, the tuple is also strongly achievable.
IV. TRADEOFF ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we proposed a linear storage code
∆P and retrieval scheme ΘV. Conditions under which the
retrieval scheme is error-free and private have also been
identified in Theorem 2. In this section, we will analyse the
tradeoffs between the storage cost and the retrieval cost of our
codes in the simplest special case when
Φ = {{k} : k ∈ K}.
Proposition 1: If V and P satisfy the retrievability condi-
tion in Theorem 2, then for any subset β ⊆ K,
(T + L−R)(K − |β|) ≤ rank(P(β))(T + L)
where P(β) is the submatrix of P by removing the rows
indexed by k ∈ β.
Proof: Let β be a subset of K. Consider again the system
of equations in (28). Suppose the user is informed by a genie
about the values of the following unknowns
{(wt,k, w∗`,k) : t ∈ T , ` ∈ L and k ∈ β}. (45)
In that case, the number of remaining unknowns is now only
(T + L)(K − |β|). Given (45), the following equations
T∑
t=1
vt,r,kwt,k +
L∑
`=1
v∗`,r,kw
∗
`,k = 0, ∀k ∈ β, r ∈ R (46)
will become redundant. By direct counting, there are at most
rank(P(β))(T + L) + (K − |β|)R
non-redundant equations left in (28). Therefore, if the linear
system (28) has a unique solution, then
(T + L)(K − |β|) ≤ rank(P(β))(T + L) + (K − |β|)R,
(47)
or equivalently,
(T + L−R)(K − |β|) ≤ rank(P(β))(T + L). (48)
The proposition is thus proved.
Proposition 2: If the matrix V satisfies the privacy condi-
tion (29), then R ≤ T .
Proof: Consider any k ∈ K and the columns
v∗1,1,k
...
v∗L,1,k
v1,1,k
...
vT,1,k

· · · · · ·

v∗1,R,k
...
v∗L,R,k
v1,R,k
...
vT,R,k

(49)
in V. We may assume without loss of generality that all the
columns are independent (otherwise, some of the columns can
8be discarded). Now, if R > T , then
rank(〈Vr,k, r ∈ R, k ∈ α〉) > T.
As rank(〈Vr,k, r ∈ R, k ∈ α, V0〉) ≤ T +L and rank(V0) =
L, we have rank(〈Vr,k, r ∈ R, k ∈ α〉 ∩ V0) > 0. The propo-
sition is thus proved.
Theorem 3 (Tradeoff): For any storage code ∆P and re-
trieval scheme ΘV satisfying the retrievability and privacy
condition,
1 ≤ RC(ΘV,∆P)
(
K − 1
SC(∆P)
)
. (50)
Equivalently,
RC(ΘV,∆P) ≥ SC(∆P)
KSC(∆P)− 1 . (51)
Proof: Let β = ∅. Applying Proposition 1, we have
(T + L−R)K ≤ S(T + L) (52)
T (K − S) ≤ RK − L(K − S) (53)
T ≤ RK
K − S − L. (54)
On the other hand, from Proposition 2, we have R ≤ T .
Therefore, we have
R ≤ RK
K − S − L,
R
L
≤ RK
L(K − S) − 1.
By (21) and (25), we have
1 ≤ RK
L(K − S) −
R
L
=
R
L(K − S)
(
K − K − S
1
)
.
Therefore,
1 ≤ RC(ΘV)
(
K − 1
SC(∆P)
)
Corollary 1: When K = 3, there does not exist any storage
code ∆P and retrieval scheme ΘV satisfying the retrievability
and privacy condition such that
RC(ΘV,∆P) = SC(∆P) = 1/2.
Proof: A direct consequence of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 gives a tradeoff between storage cost and
retrieval cost (in the context of our proposed classed of
schemes). It has been well known that maximum distance
separable (MDS) code has the lowest storage cost (compared
to other storage codes with the same reliability). In the
following theorem, we will show that the optimal storage-
retrieval cost tradeoff can be achieved for MDS storage codes.
Theorem 4 (Optimality): Consider any fixed K, S. One can
construct a (K,K − S) maximum distance separable (MDS)
code (specified by the parity check matrix P) and an error-
free, private retrieval scheme ΘV such that the lower bound
(50) is tight. In other words,
RC(ΘV,∆P) =
SC(∆P)
KSC(∆P)− 1 .
Proof: See Appendix B.
V. CONCLUSION
Existing work on private information retrieval (PIR) prob-
lems largely focused on uncoded data storage (where every
storage node stores all the data records). Their main focus
was to design a retrieval scheme which has the lowest total
upload (for transmitting retrieval queries) and download (for
data retrieval) costs. One main drawback for uncoded storage
is its high storage cost that the same data copy will be stored
for multiple times. In this paper, we studied the problem of
private information retrieval for coded data storage. Another
major difference between this paper and existing works is that
we focus only on the download cost. We have justified that
the upload cost does not increase with the data record size.
Therefore, in the scenario where data record size is large, the
upload cost can become negligible. A fundamental question in
PIR problems in coded storage is the characterisation of the
tradeoffs between storage costs and retrieval costs. We have
shown, to our surprise, that the tradeoff in fact depends on the
number of data records in the system.
In the second half of the paper, we proposed a fairly general
class of linear storage codes (where the underlying storage
codes are specified by a parity check matrix) and an associated
information retrieval scheme. We have identified conditions
under which the retrieval scheme is error-free and private.
One interesting property of our scheme is that the storage and
retrieval costs are the same for any number of data records.
Tradeoffs between the storage cost and the retrieval cost of
our proposed schemes are then obtained. We also considered
specific scenarios where MDS codes are used in the underlying
coded storage. We have showed that a “randomly constructed”
retrieval scheme is in fact optimal (in minimising the retrieval
costs).
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Suppose to the contrary that the storage-retrieval cost tuple
(1/2, 1/2) is strongly achievable. By definition, there exists a
sequence of (N (a), 3) storage codes Ω(a) and Φ-private, error-
free retrieval schemes Λ(a) = (Λ(a)1 ,Λ
(a)
2,k) such that
lim sup
a→∞
SC(Ω(a)) ≤ 1
2
(55)
lim sup
a→∞
RC(Λ(a),Ω(a)) ≤ 1
2
(56)
lim
a→∞N
(a) =∞. (57)
For each a, let (D(a)n , n = 1, . . . , N (a)) be the data
records and (X(a)k , k = 1, . . . ,K
(a)) be the content stored
at the storage nodes. The retrieval scheme is defined by
(M (a), Q
(a)
k , A
(a)
k , k ∈ K). For notation simplicity, we will
often drop the superscript (a) in the remainder of the proof.
First, notice that (Dn, n ∈ N ) is mutually independent (see
also (7)). Therefore, for any k ∈ K,
I(QkAk;DN ) ≥
∑
n∈N
I(QkAk;Dn). (58)
On the other hand,
I(QkAk;DN ) = I(Qk;DN ) + I(Ak;DN |Qk) (59)
≤ H(Ak|Qk). (60)
Here, the last inequality follows from (5). Therefore
H(Ak|Qk) ≥
∑
n∈N
I(QkAk;Dn) (61)
and consequently,
lim sup
a→∞
maxk∈K
∑N
n=1 I(QkAk;Dn)
H(D1)
≤ lim sup
a→∞
maxk∈KH(Ak|Qk)
H(D1)
(62)
≤ 1
2
(63)
where the last inequality follows from (55). Hence, for any
c > 1/2 and sufficiently large a, we have
c ≥ maxk∈K
∑N
n=1 I(QkAk;Dn)
H(D1)
. (64)
Consequently,∑
k∈K
∑N
n=1 I(QkAk;Dn)
N
≤ cKH(D1)
N
. (65)
Therefore, there must exist at least one n∗ such that∑
k∈K
I(QkAk;Dn∗) ≤ cKH(D1)
N
which implies that for all k ∈ K,
I(QkAk;Dn∗) ≤ cKH(D1)
N
. (66)
Now, notice that
H(M,Qk, Xk, Dn∗ , Ak)
= H(M) +H(Qk|M) +H(XkDn∗ |M,Qk)
+H(Ak|M,Qk, Xk, Dn∗)
(i)
= H(M) +H(Qk) +H(XkDn∗ |Qk)
+H(Ak|Qk, Xk, Dn∗)
= H(M) +H(Qk, Xk, Dn∗ , Ak)
where (i) follows from (5), (6) and (9). Hence, M and
(Qk, Xk, Dn∗ , Ak) are independent. Consequently, for suffi-
ciently large a,
I(Dn∗ ;QkAk|M = n∗) = I(Dn∗ ;QkAk) (67)
≤ cKH(D1)
N
(68)
(ii)
=
cKH(Dn∗)
N
. (69)
Here, (ii) follows from that H(Dn) is constant for all n.
Similarly, by using (56) and the privacy condition (9), we can
prove that for sufficiently large a,
H(Ak|Qk,M = n∗) ≤ cH(Dn∗). (70)
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In addition, by (5), (6) and (8), we have
I(XK, Dn∗ ;QK|M = n∗) = 0 (71)
H(Dn∗ |QK, AK,M = n∗) = 0 (72)
H(Ak|Qk, Xk,M = n∗) = 0 (73)
Before we continue, we will need the following intermediate
lemma.
Lemma 1:
2H(Dn∗) +H(A1|QKA2Dn∗)
≤ 2H(A1|Q1) +H(A2|Q2X2) + 2H(A3|Q3)
+H(Dn∗ |QKAK) + I(Q2A2;Dn∗) + I(QK;X2Dn∗).
(74)
Consequently,
2H(Dn∗ |M = n∗) +H(A1|QKA2Dn∗ ,M = n∗)
≤2H(A1|Q1,M = n∗) +H(A2|Q2X2,M = n∗)
+ 2H(A3|Q3,M = n∗) +H(Dn∗ |QKAK,M = n∗)
+ I(Q2A2;Dn∗ |M = n∗) + I(QK;X2Dn∗ |M = n∗).
(75)
Proof: Using [16], we can obtain the following equality
which can be directly verified by re-writing each term in terms
of joint entropy.
− 2H(Dn∗)−H(A1|QKA2Dn∗)
=H(A2|QK, Dn∗ , A1, A3, X2) + I(A1;Q3|Q1, Q2, A2)
+H(A3|QKA1A2Dn∗X2) + I(A1;A2|QKDn∗X2)
+ I(A1;Q2|Q1A2) + I(A1;A2|Q1) + I(A1;A3|QKA2)
+ I(Q1;A2|Q2Q3) + I(Q2;Dn∗ |X2) + I(Q2;X2)
+ I(Q1;A3|Q3A2) + I(A2;A3|Q3) + I(Q3;A2|Q2)
+ I(Q2;A3|Q1Q3A2) + I(Q3;X2|Q1Q2A2Dn∗)
+ I(A2;Dn∗ |Q2X2) + I(A2;A3|QKA1X2Dn∗)
+ I(Q1;X2|Q2A2Dn∗) + I(X2;A3|QKA1A2Dn∗)
− 2H(A1|Q1)−H(A2|Q2X2)− 2H(A3|Q3)
−H(Dn∗ |QKAK)− I(Q2A2;Dn∗)− I(QK;X2Dn∗).
Hence, the lemma follows from the nonnegativity of mutual
information and entropies.
Now, by invoking Lemma 1, and (69) – (73), we have
H(A1|QKA2Dn∗ ,M = n∗) ≤
(
4c− 2 + cK
N
)
H(Dn∗).
Similarly, for i 6= j,
H(Ai|QKAjDn∗ ,M = n∗) ≤
(
4c− 2 + cK
N
)
H(Dn∗)
by symmetry. Finally, for any n ∈ N ,
H(Dn|X1, Dn∗)
(iii)
= H(Dn|X1, Dn∗ , QK,M = n) (76)
≤ H(Dn, AK|X1, Dn∗ , QK,M = n) (77)
(iv)
= H(AK|X1, Dn∗ , QK,M = n) (78)
≤
∑
k 6=1
H(Ak|X1, A1, Dn∗ , QK,M = n)
+H(A1|X1, Dn∗ , QK,M = n) (79)
=
∑
k 6=1
H(Ak|X1, A1, Dn∗ , QK,M = n)
≤ K
(
4c− 2 + cK
N
)
H(Dn∗) (80)
where (iii) follows from (5) and (iv) from (8). Hence,
H(DN |X1, Dn∗) ≤
∑
n∈N
H(Dn|X1, Dn∗) (81)
≤ NK
(
4c− 2 + cK
N
)
H(Dn∗). (82)
Consequently,
NH(Dn∗)
= H(DN )
≤ H(X1, Dn∗) +H(DN |X1, Dn∗)
≤ H(X1) +H(Dn∗) +H(DN |X1, Dn∗)
≤ H(X1) +H(Dn∗) +NK
(
4c− 2 + cK
N
)
H(Dn∗).
Therefore,
1 ≤ H(X1)
NH(Dn∗)
+
1
N
+K
(
4c− 2 + cK
N
)
. (83)
Consequently,
lim inf
a→∞
H(X1)
NH(Dn∗)
+
1
N
+K
(
4c− 2 + cK
N
)
≥ 1.
As c is arbitrarily close to 1/2, together with (57), we have
lim inf
a→∞
H(X1)
NH(Dn∗)
≥ 1.
In other words, SC(Ω(a)) ≥ 1. The theorem is proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Consider any K and S < K. For sufficiently large field
GF (q), we can always construct a (K,K − S) MDS code.
Let its K × S parity check matrix be P and ∆P be the
corresponding induced storage code. Hence,
SC(∆P) =
1
K − S .
Let R = T = K − S and L = S. Hence, T + L = K
and the matrix V is indeed a square matrix. Now consider the
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retrieval scheme ΘV. It can be verified easily that
RC(ΘP,∆V) =
1
S
and hence the equality in (50) holds.
To prove the theorem, it suffices to prove that one can
construct a matrix V such that its induced retrieval scheme ΘV
is error-free and private. First of all, for notation simplicity,
we rewrite the variables in (28) as follows:
zi,k =
{
w∗i,k if 1 ≤ i ≤ L
wi−L,k if 1 ≤ i− L ≤ T.
(84)
yi,r,k =
{
v∗i,r,k if 1 ≤ i ≤ L
vi−L,r,k if 1 ≤ i− L ≤ T
(85)
Using the new notation, (28) becomes
K∑
k=1
pk,szi,k = 0, ∀i ∈ K, s ∈ S (86)
K∑
i=1
yi,r,kzi,k = 0, ∀k ∈ K, r ∈ R. (87)
As P is the K × S parity-check matrix of a (K,K − S)
MDS code. Hence, for any i ∈ K and a subset β ⊆ K of size
at least K − S, if
K∑
k=1
pk,szi,k = 0, ∀s ∈ S
and zi,k = 0 for all k ∈ β, then zi,k = 0 for all k ∈ K.
Next, let
yi,r,k ,
{
1 if 0 = k − i− r mod K
0 otherwise
(88)
for i, k ∈ K and r ∈ R. Let
 , {(i, k) : ∃r ∈ R such that 0 = k − i− r mod K}.
Then (87) becomes
zi,k = 0, ∀(i, k) ∈ .
Also, for any fixed i ∈ K, the set {k : (i, k) ∈ } has exactly
R = K − S elements. Therefore, by the construction of P,
we can conclude that zi,k = 0 for all i ∈ K. Hence, for our
choice of yi,r,k (and hence, v∗i,r,k and vi,r,k), the retrievability
condition is satisfied.
So far, we proved the existence of V (via (85) and (88)) such
that the retrievability condition will be satisfied. However, the
chosen V may not satisfy the privacy condition (29). In the
following, we will prove the existence of a matrix V which
can satisfy both conditions.
The proof for existence relies much on the well-known
Schwartz-Zippel Lemma [17], [18] which is restated as fol-
lows.
Lemma 2 (Schwartz-Zippel Lemma [17], [18]): Let
F [b1, . . . , bn] be a non-zero polynomial with degree γ ≥ 0
over the finite field GF (q). If b1, . . . , bn are randomly and
independently chosen from the field, then the probability that
F [b1, . . . , bn] = 0 will be at most d/q.
Now, consider again the system of linear equations (28).
The retrievability condition will be satisfied if and only if the
determinant of the coefficient matrix for (28) is non-zero. Let
F (v∗`,r,k, vt,r,k, t ∈ T , r ∈ R, k ∈ K, ` ∈ L)
be the determinant function. Here, we assume that P is given
and fixed. Clearly, the determinant function F is a non-zero
polynomial because we have already shown earlier that it has
non-zero values for some choices of
v∗`,r,k, vt,r,k, t ∈ T , r ∈ R, k ∈ K, ` ∈ L.
Applying the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, for sufficiently large
q, the determinant function is non-zero with arbitrarily high
probability. In other words, the retrievability condition holds
with high probability, if
v∗`,r,k, vt,r,k, t ∈ T , r ∈ R, k ∈ K, ` ∈ L
are in fact chosen randomly (and when q is sufficiently
large). Finally, to prove the theorem, it suffices to prove that
the privacy condition will also be satisfied by a randomly
generated V with arbitrarily high probability.
Notice the columns
Vr,k = [v
∗
1,r,k, . . . , v
∗
L,r,k, v1,r,k, . . . , vT,r,k]
>.
Since each element v∗`,r,k or vt,r,k is randomly and indepen-
dently selected and rank(V0) = S, the probability that
〈Vr,k, r = 1, . . . R〉 ∩ V0 = {0} (89)
is equal to
K−S−1∏
c=0
(
1− q
S+c
qK
)
≥
(
1− 1
q
)K−S
.
Hence, the probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1 for
sufficiently large q. In other words, the privacy condition will
also be satisfied by a randomly generated V. The theorem is
proved.
